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ABSTRACT
The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been
abducting individuals from across the world and flying them to
other states with the knowledge, and even intent, that they are
tortured in order to collect intelligence. Placing blame on the USA,
or at least the CIA, in this case is therefore unproblematic. The
capture, transportation or housing of an individual with the intent
to inflict harm means that the USA has placed itself as a key actor
and so can be directly blamed. However, claims can also been
made against other states who aided in these rendition
programmes by sharing intelligence, by allowing the use of their
facilities or simply by being aware and not acting. Ascribing
blame to these states is difficult as their involvement is often
unclear, unnecessary or far removed from the activity itself. To
better understand their involvement this paper will argue that
complicity, and therefore blame, should not be considered so
strictly, and that instead it is better to think of a spectrum of
involvement. This allows a more flexible understanding of blame,
making it possible to evaluate those who are more removed from
the torture and in doing so argue that more states should be
implicated than originally thought.
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Introduction
It is important to start with the position that torture is prohibited absolutely. While there
are many important arguments on both sides of the debate regarding whether or not
torture should be allowed, the first position of this paper is that it is prohibited ethically
as well as in international and domestic law.1 The extraordinary rendition programme
developed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which systematically
abducted people from locations across the world and transferred them to other counties
to be interrogated in ways too extreme to have been allowed under any American jurisdic-
tion, is therefore also ethically prohibited.2 In this instance the ethical blame levied at the
USA, or at least at the CIA, should be clear. The capture, transportation or detainment of
an individual with the intent to inflict extreme levels of physical, psychological and
emotional pain to gain intelligence means that the USA placed itself as a key actor in
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the harm caused and so can be directly blamed as a result.3 However, claims have also been
made against other states that they aided in these rendition programmes, raising questions
regarding the extent to which we should condemn those who aid, assist or are just aware of
the rendition programme. Indeed, Swiss Senator Dick Marty, author of the Council of
Europe’s report Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of
Europe Member States, identified a complex ‘global spider web’ used for ‘targeting, appre-
hending and detaining terrorist suspects’, detailing a number of different states that have
been involved in the rendition process in a variety of different ways.4 Ascribing blame to
these states, however, is difficult when their involvement is temporally or causally distant
from the torture.
This paper will argue that involvement, and therefore blame, should not be con-
sidered as strictly as it often is, but that instead it is better to think of a spectrum of
involvement and therefore a spectrum of blame. There is too much focus on trying to
allocate as much blame as possible on those who are causally closest to the harmful
enterprise, when effort should also be allowed for different levels of blame to be attrib-
uted to those with varying degrees of involvement – even those at the periphery. That is,
by being a link in the chain – whether before or after, necessary or not, with or without
direct intent – should still be seen as being sufficiently involved and these states should
face the consequences of aiding torture. Moreover, it will be argued that claims of ignor-
ance are not sufficient protections in these situations: the intelligence community and
state leaders are highly specialised and informed entities that should be aware of how
their actions contribute to causing others harm or violate domestic and international
law, and a lack of being duly informed about their involvement makes them as culpable
as those who knew. By expanding the circle of perpetrators the blame is not diminished,
but rather increases the number of those who should face the consequences. By arguing
for a more nuanced understanding of blame this paper will claim that more states and
their leaders should be implicated for the harm caused than originally thought.5 It is
only by understanding who is to blame, and the nature and level of that blame in this
way, that those harmed can begin to seek redress, whether this is compensation from
states that contributed or punishment for those political and intelligence leaders who
failed to act.6
The aim of the paper is to highlight how we determine who – whether state, institution
or individual – should be morally blamed for the harms done by other actors. A key aspect
of moral blame is determining who is responsible for the harm done to another and deser-
ving of the blame, often as a means of forming the basis for measuring out the necessary
level of punishment.7 Placing moral blame outside the immediate instigator is about
understanding what relationship one has to the harmer and the harmed and how one’s
(in)actions are featured. To this end, domestic legal precedent – notably tort law on
how to govern responsibilities between people and determining who is culpable for the
harm done to another – can offer a way forward. By examining the legal processes and
precedents involved and drawing out the underlying ethical principles found in domestic
law, a new ethical framework can be advanced for determining which and to what degree
actors in the international sphere should be blamed.8 This will involve working through
three key questions: first, on the relationship between actors and what duties of care
they create; second, what knowledge those involved had, or should have had, in terms
of how their actions would cause others harm; and finally, the nature of one’s involvement
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in the harm done. Together, answers to these questions give a detailed picture of who is to
blame for harm befalling another.9
What is known and what is argued: extraordinary rendition and blame
What is currently known about the CIA’s rendition programme is largely the result of the
pivotal work of those involved in The Rendition Project – a collaborative research project
pioneered by Ruth Blakeley and Sam Raphael – who have worked alongside the charity
Reprieve, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and the efforts of European Parliament
and Council of Europe to provide a substantial database of work.10 The Rendition
Project has systematically worked through ‘testimony from detainees, Red Cross
reports, courtroom evidence, flight records and invoices’ to demonstrate that not only
was the whole rendition programme much more extensive than originally thought but
the involvement of other states such as the UK was much greater.11 The database
details the CIA’s rendition flights that collected and transported individuals to secret
locations for abusive interrogation and indefinite detention, containing over 11,000
flights that are mapped according to their role in the rendition circuit, including 119 pris-
oners and over 60 rendition flights. What abuse was actually suffered by those rendered
has since been outlined in excruciating detail in the Senate Torture Report, including
(but not limited to) the use of rectal rehydration, violent rape, induced hypothermia,
stress positions for extensive periods of time resulting in broken limbs, waterboarding,
sleep, sensory and food deprivation, mock executions and ‘coffin’ sized incarceration.12
At the centre of this torture network was the use of ‘black sites’: ‘secret prisons built
and run by the CIA with the acquiescence of host governments, wherein prisoners were
held secretly for months or years on end, without access to legal representation or
other contact with the outside world’.13 Most notable in Europe were those located in
Poland, Romania and Lithuania that detained the ‘most high-profile of prisoners’ for
‘months or years in secret’ carrying out the ‘most egregious abuses’.14 The network also
relied on the outsourcing of the interrogation to other states, Egypt and Jordan for
example, that are known for their use of torture, with the CIA directly organising the col-
lection, transportation and questions to be asked once there.15 These different detention
sites were then linked up through the CIA’s rendition flights, often using civilian aircraft
chartered by the CIA through dummy companies to facilitate the collection and transpor-
tation of detainees.16 The rendition circuit itself could then consist of several legs, includ-
ing flying through several states’ airspace, landing to refuel or exchanging prisoners
between planes mid-circuit.17
While this therefore gives good evidence for those directly involved in the renditions,
understanding the role of those on the periphery is more difficult. Indeed, Amnesty Inter-
national has petitioned the Irish government to launch an inquiry into their involvement
and failure to ‘address overflights or landings of planes on rendition circuits’.18 While the
UK has long denied any involvement in the rendition programme19 it was careful to frame
its denial so that ‘there was an emphasis on the restraining effects of the Americans and the
legality of the operations’ and that in those instances where they did know they did not
offer any ‘active assistance’.20
Such ambiguity makes ascribing blame difficult, even though the topic of blame is
itself nothing new. Indeed, legal scholars have spent considerable time and energy
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devising methods to aid in outlining exactly who should be blamed for what and the
repercussions they should face as a result.21 At the international level Erskine success-
fully argues for the state and its institutions as being moral agents which should be
responsible as separate entities for their actions, which works well in establishing the
foundation that states and their intelligence agencies are morally culpable actors
who should be evaluated for their involvement in the harm done by others and that
they should be blamed and punished accordingly.22 However, beyond this foundation
the various literatures on blame and complicity – whether it be legal, international
relations or applied ethics – are fraught with debates on where to draw the necessary
lines, why that position is the correct one and what the implications are likely to be.
Indeed, Dressler argues that the application of complicity as a concept is essentially
a ‘disgrace’ and has resulted in inconsistent usages by international legal bodies.23
One key problem is that complicity is often reduced to questions of causation, and a
form of causation that emphasises a strict chain of events. Courts, for example, have
often examined physical engagement as the main determining factor for complicity.24
This is problematic for a few reasons. First is that this type of causality is often too
strict, meaning that those at the periphery or even mid-point are ignored.25 For
example, Gardner, Lombard and Rabin each place the accomplice’s role as being a
counterfactual; that without the second’s input the action would not have been able
to occur.26 This, however, fails to take into account acts of omission where those
who fail to intervene should also be considered as being complicit in the activity, as
well as those who might not be depended upon for the resulting harm but have
made the process an easier journey. A second problem is that causality is taken as
the only measure used to determine who is to blame when there are other factors
that need to be included, namely the types of the relationships that exist between
those involved and the knowledge that those involved do, or should, have. Indeed,
Jamie Gaskarth argues that ‘level of knowledge on the part of the secondary party
about the actions they are undertaking and intent in terms of wanting to assist the
criminal purpose of the principal’ should be included.27 These are important factors
to consider as he argues that even if someone is causally involved they are not necess-
arily complicit, whereby ‘the shopkeeper who lawfully sells a knife should not be liable
as an accomplice if the customer goes on to use it in a mugging’.28 Their role is
mediated if they did not intend or know that their actions contribute to the harm.
However, while recognising that intent and knowledge are important factors, this
paper will go further and argue that a lack of intent or lack of knowledge in and of
themselves are not complete protections. Rather, for those who did not intend the
harm they should have acted to undermine the primary’s efforts; while for those
who did not know, the question is whether they should have known and whether a
lack of investigation can make them equally complicit in the harm done.
A spectrum of blame
This paper will therefore argue for a much more flexible understanding of involvement
and therefore blame. By breaking each of the factors involved – relationship to the
harm, knowledge, intent and duty of care – into different ranks, multiple levels of
blame, and therefore subsequent punishment, can be understood. In order to make
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this argument the paper will use those principles that underpin tort law to create a
more rounded and flexible framework for understanding an actor’s involvement –
one that is able to account for different causal contributions while integrating the
different relationships and knowledge that these actors can have. For causality this
means understanding different role types: from being a causal contributor to a non-
causal contributor or even a non-causal non-contributor. In terms of the relationship,
those who have a formalised and specific duty to protect someone face a greater level of
blame when they fail this bond than someone who is unrelated, with no formal con-
nection. In terms of required knowledge and intent, those who are fully informed
about a situation face a greater degree of blame when they fail to act than those
who had no knowledge and there is no expectation for them to have any knowledge
on how their actions might cause harm; and where those whose intent is not reflected
in an appropriate counter-action should be considered to have failed to act against the
harmful activities of the primary enough to remove themselves from the blame.
The blame framework proposed therefore makes some key contributions to the wider
field of international politics as it offers a means of going outside those immediately
responsible for the harmful action. This allows for a wider scope in bringing cases
against those involved, such that not only are states denounced but political leaders and
directors of intelligence organisations should be held personally responsible and punished
for the harms caused under their watch.29 Specific duties of care attributed to particular
individuals, for example, will mean one can move away from blaming whole states for
human rights abuses (and having the blame distributed across different state institutions,
thus diminishing it to nothing), and start attributing blame to authorising individuals and
demand an appropriate punishment (whether criminal or civil) of those in positions of
power at the time. 30
By exploring some hard cases regarding Europe’s involvement in the extraordinary
rendition programme, it will be possible to understand the proposed spectrum of
blame better while also giving detailed statements on the type of blame these states
should face as a result of their (in)action. In order to achieve this the paper will sys-
tematically work through the same processes the courts do when tackling such ques-
tions, examining the tort law criteria of duty of care, foreseeable foreknowledge and
proximity to the harm. The spectrum established will build upon these existing
legal procedures in order to provide key tools for processing existing questions of
blame.
Duty of care
The first step in determining whether someone, or indeed some organisation, is blame-
worthy for a harm caused to another is understanding what relationships are involved
and whether they create a particular moral bond that then establishes a duty of care on
those involved. This is important because some relationships or roles can carry with
them a greater set of duties than others, and depending on the failure to fulfil these
duties the level of blame can change. These relationships can be created and defined by
the roles, ranks or professions those involved hold, often carrying varying additional stan-
dards of care.31
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At the most general level, individuals have a duty to not cause others harm through
their (in)actions, where all must take reasonable care in their actions or omissions so as
not to cause harm to others proximate to them.32 Second, separate ‘professional negli-
gence’ (the failure to fulfil one’s professional obligations) exists for those who belong to
a specified profession that comes with its own set of ethical standards and whose
members are expected to have higher than average abilities, knowledge or training.
Indeed, in legal terms the Bolam Test, established in Bolam v Friern Hospital, sets
down how those acting as professionals providing services – from surveyors and estate
agents to doctors, solicitors, accountants, financial services providers, information tech-
nology professionals, patent agents, etc. – are to be judged by the standards of their pro-
fession as a whole and the duties of care they have towards particular individuals.33 This
means that they are placed under a separate, higher set of expectations. The duty of care
also includes the more specific duties of professional rescuers – such as doctors or life-
guards – to aid those in harm’s way or who have been harmed.34 For example, emergency
responders such as paramedics, firefighters and police officers have a duty to respond to
and rescue those members of the public that require their assistance. A third type of duty
to care is created when a ‘special relationship’ between the two actors exists, when one
party takes on the responsibility for the other through a care-giving role or relationship
of trust. For example, parents have a special relationship with their minor children, as
do common carriers with their patrons, spouses with each other and property owners
towards invitees.35 Fourth, there is a particular duty to aid those harmed when
the actor has himself created a hazardous condition that can harm others.36 Finally,
there is a duty of care when dangerous acts are committed by a third party on an
actor’s property which he knew about, or should have known about, and did not take
reasonable steps to prevent it.37
Equally important are relationships established through a hierarchical structure. The
chain of command, for example, details the responsibility that a senior individual has
for the actions of those beneath. As Walzer notes, ‘officers take on immense responsi-
bilities, unlike anything in civilian life… the higher their rank, the greater their reach
of their command, and larger their responsibility’.38 As people are put in charge over
others this creates a relationship where the superior has a moral obligation to protect
the subordinate in return for fealty. Importantly, there is also an obligation for those
higher up a chain of command to actively know and take responsibility for the actions
of those beneath them, and to ensure that those individuals for whom they are respon-
sible are behaving accordingly. That is, leaders have an obligation to ensure that those
under them are suitably trained and informed and that they obey the rules, and to
prevent or punish anyone who fails to meet the expected standards. Indeed,
command responsibility as understood in international law and the International
Criminal Court holds the commander culpable for the crimes of their subordinates.39
For example, the command responsibility provisions of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia and International Tribunal for Rwanda statutes,
Articles 7(3) and 6(3), respectively, state
that a person possessing command authority, whether as a civilian or military leader, may
also be responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates if the leader fails to prevent
the crimes or fails to punish the crimes once they occur.40
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This means that those in positions of authority have a responsibility to prevent the
harmful actions of and/or punish those within the realm of their authority for the
harms that they cause.
In order to understand the type of relationships involved and the duty of care
created, key questions can be asked, including how do actors relate to one another;
what type of actor are they; what roles do they have in relation to each other and
do these roles establish any special expectations. The answers to these questions can
then detail the duties created and how they differ in their quality, ranging from very
general relationships established through some implicit participation in a cultural,
moral or legal norm, to specific relationships where obligations are clearly defined
and codified.
What is important is that there is a relationship, a bond, between actors that creates
a duty of care on one or both of them, and that when one fails in fulfilling the associ-
ated obligations one can be blamed for the harm that ensues. What this means for state
activity is that it is necessary to understand how its activities, institutions and repre-
sentatives relate to others: whether the individual harmed is a citizen and so has a duty
of care afforded to them through the social contract whereby people give up their
absolute freedoms in exchange for the protection of the state from harm; or if the
state’s own actions create a bond of care to those impacted by their conduct; or
whether there is an obligation created through the physical control they exert over
their territory and the obligation they take on as hosts. For state institutions and pro-
fessionals – whether political, military or civil – the question is whether they are
adhering to the standards and additional duties expected of their particular rank, pos-
ition or role, guaranteeing that the actions of their organisation and those subordinate
to them are correct, and preventing or punishing any shortfall that could cause others
harm. From this, distinctions can be drawn between those professional leaders of the
different intelligence organisations who have a duty to ensure that their own subordi-
nates are acting accordingly, and political leaders who hold responsibility over these
institutions, and the general duty that the state acts according to ethical and legal
norms.
In terms of the spectrum of blame it can be argued, therefore, that at the weaker end of
the spectrum, where the lowest level of blame would be ascribed, the type of bonds
involved could include those created by broad relationships between all individuals to
take care not to cause harm to others.41 Above this level are those relationships
between more specific actors (both individuals and organisations) where clearer obli-
gations are laid down for the one in a position of authority. In this middle part of the spec-
trum are those in a general position of authority or jurisdiction, with clear relationships
but where the agreement might be entered into tacitly and/or delineated through some
domestic or international law that can be applied in a variety of different situations –
for example, the relationship between the state and its citizens where state institutions
are obligated to protect civilians.42 Above this are those relationships that are then very
specific, created by a contract that one or both sides enter into through their own
action, often ascribing particular duties to specific people.43 At this top end there are
those who have a clear, direct and empowered relationship over another with a clear set
of responsibilities and can, therefore, face a significant degree of blame when they fail
to fulfil their role (see Table 1).
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Foreseeable foreknowledge
In order to ascribe blame to those involved it is also necessary that they were able to foresee,
or should be expected to have foreseen, the harm. This relies on temporal awareness and rel-
evant knowledge: that, first, in order for an individual to be blamed it must be assumed that
the repercussions of his (in)actions are not so far in the future that it would be unreasonable
for him to foresee the impact of the decisions he makes in the present. Quite simply, individ-
uals are only capable of judging so far into the future, and so it is unreasonable to expect them
to calculate the consequences of their actions ad infinitum. And, second, that the individual
possesses the knowledge required to make the necessary calculation, including the physical
capacity to make a rational choice as well as to retain the relevant facts.44
Understanding the balance of blame therefore depends on what role or position an
actor has and the responsibility to be informed that it creates. For example, those
higher up the chain of command are bestowed with the responsibility to be aware of
what happens beneath them. Ranks or positions in society can also delineate the additional
resources and information that these individuals have as compared to the standard indi-
vidual. For example, a low-ranked individual would be privy to a limited amount of infor-
mation on what was occurring, and only within their direct realm, and so it would be
unreasonable to expect them to know more, whereas someone with seniority has a
greater responsibility to know what is going on, has greater resources to find out what
occurring, and is more likely to have a wider understanding of events. Moreover, claiming
a simple lack of knowledge is not sufficient. In Francis v. United Jersey Bank, a director was
held personally liable for not reading the firm’s financial statements as she had failed in her
responsibility to have all the relevant information she would need to make a full and
rational decision.45 Essentially, those in a position of authority or responsibility are
bound with the obligation to be informed and to investigate all of that which is within
their care. Indeed, different state institutions have divided areas of responsibility and as
such are charged with the requirement of ensuring that those areas are covered. Therefore,
those on the bottom rung have no duty to investigate what is outside their direct realm or
above them, whereas the leader of a group or organisation should ensure they are as
informed as possible. What this means is that it is possible to highlight not only insti-
tutions that should be blamed, but also individuals within those institutions. Institution
Table 1. Actor relationships and duties created.
Level of blame Low Low/medium Medium/high High
Relationship
between
actors
. Bond between
standard
individual
. Low organisational
position
. Duty towards those
with whom one has
a tacit/implicit
agreement
. Role/professional
responsibilities
. Explicit
agreement
. Dependents
. Directed and
specified duty to
care for relationship
. Position of
authority and
power over another
Duty created . General
interpersonal
norms to not
cause others
harm
. Duty to act
professionally
towards ‘clients’
and ‘co-workers’
. Broad legal
obligations to
classes of
individuals defined
by role
. Professional
obligations and
explicit duties
. Duty towards
those within
one’s care/trust
. Ensure those within
one’s care are
protected and act
accordingly
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leaders have a duty to ensure that their organisation is acting ethically, and when it fails
they can be held personally liable. This would allow for a greater understanding of how to
actually ascribe blame: that senior management or indeed political leaders who authorise
such operations (or fail to prevent them) should face personal liability and therefore pun-
ishment for the harm caused.
What this criterion does, therefore, is to again highlight the obligation of those in positions
of authority to ensure that they are suitably informed and trained. For the state and its insti-
tutions this means that those in a leadership position or rank have an obligation to be
informed on what their subordinates are doing and to be aware of how the actions of
either the state generally or their own organisation specifically can cause others harm.
Again, it can be seen that intelligence agency leaders should be informed on their own sub-
ordinates and the impact of their own organisation’s activities, while political leaders should
be informed on how the activities of the state as a whole can cause harm. Political leaders
cannot claim plausible deniability whereby the intelligence community protects the executive
from blame by withholding information and politicians ask no questions; there is a duty to be
informed and failure to be so still makes them blameworthy (see Table 2).
Relationship to the harm
Finally, understanding how one’s (in)activity is connected to the harm caused is also of
vital importance. The relationship between actors and the harm caused is important as
it details ‘in both criminal law and in ordinary ethical thought…ways one person can
be liable… for bad things… done through the agency of another’; it gives details on
how one’s (in)actions feature while illustrating whether and how an actor was living up
to their duty of care.46 This is, however, a difficult topic, made more so by a rather
diverse taxonomy used throughout the literature, with terms sometimes used interchange-
ably and without care to delineate the different levels of blame that each contribution
would represent.47 Indeed, ‘aiding and abetting’, the mainstay of legal terminology, is
too broad to cover the necessarily different forms of procuring, causing, inducing,
failing to prevent, permitting, enabling, persuading, allowing, participating, being an acces-
sory, being a dependant, contributing and sanctioning. It can be argued that each of these
terms offers a morally distinct role and so can be used to delineate a spectrum of complicity
Table 2. Position and expected knowledge and action.
Level of
blame Low Low/medium Medium/high High
Role,
position,
rank
Standard
individual
Lower level
employee
Middle management Leadership, representatives,
authority
Knowledge
expected
. Standard
knowledge of
facilities/
capabilities
. Aware of how
their actions
impact others
. Standard
professional
training
. Aware of the
impact of own
actions on
others
. Aware of
subordinate
actions
. Aware of subordinate
actions
. Aware of how the
professional
decisions made can
impact those outside
the organisation
. Aware of subordinate
actions
. Aware of the whole
organisation’s activities
and potential harm to
those within and outside
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that can outline different levels of blame. Depending on the nature of one’s involvement
one can be held more or less to blame, or even excused from moral blame. For
example, the nature of the blame they face would be different if they were the person
pulling the trigger, or were a witness to someone else pulling a trigger, or were forced to
pull the trigger by a threat to their own life. Thus, the complicity criteria detail not only
the nature of the level of blame but also who should not be blamed. However, the tra-
ditional understandings of one’s relationship to the harm done by others relies too
heavily on strict causal conceptions of complicity whereby one should have either a
causal or a contributory involvement. Instead, it will be argued here that even those
who have a non-causal, non-contributory relationship should face some degree of blame.
At the top end of the spectrum are those actions that have a direct contributory role,
close either temporally or by an uninterrupted chain of events; this is Gardner’s strict
causal links or what Goodin and Lepora refer to as co-principles.48 Gardner, for
example, argued that someone leaving a baby locked up in a house with no food for a
month killed the child by failing to feed her. However, if an individual fails to prevent
someone else from poisoning a child then Gardner argues the causal link is mediated
by someone else’s act of killing.49 This strict understanding of complicity requires a situ-
ation where the principal ‘would not have committed her wrong but for the accomplice’s
intervention’.50
A section down, but still facing a significant degree of blame, are what Lombard refers
to as ‘enabling acts’, or necessary but not on their own sufficient factors: ‘setting the cir-
cumstances necessary for someone else to cause the harm… leaving the key in the
ignition’,51 or a ‘match being dry is a condition that makes it possible for it to light
when struck, but it was not the cause of the flame’.52 This would include direct aid, per-
suasion, facilitating or directly contributing within the chain of events.
A step below this includes Kutz’s causal influences, whereby one’s role is not necessary
but plays a not unimportant step within the chain of events. The situation Kutz presents is,
If a criminally-minded acquaintance is debating whether to burgle a house, [and] I tell him I
know of a fence who can help dispose of the loot, and this consideration is dispositive in his
deliberations, then I causally contribute to his act.53
The accomplice’s role is not necessary, yet its contribution increases the likelihood or
makes easier the harmful end and so should be seen as playing an important role. This
section includes advice, persuasion, sanctioning and promoting, whether through direct
encouragement, permitting the activity or failing to prevent the activity when it is
within one’s clear ability to do so. Both of these types of involvement are non-causal con-
tributing factors because while they are not the reason for the harm done they are directly
contributing to it being achieved.
However, this paper will push the concept of complicity further by arguing that non-
causal non-contributions should also be included. Non-causal non-contributions are
those (in)actions that are connected to the harm yet could not be considered to be a
cause, participation or contribution. These non-causal non-contributions argued for
here are designed to capture those acts where the actor has failed to act, and while the
failure did not make the causing of the harm easier, neither did it make it harder. Not-
acting is not necessarily the absence of action, but the active prevention of acting; the
decision not to act. For example, watching someone drown, or being drowned, and not
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jumping in to save them does not make them drown any more quickly nor does it prevent
others from jumping in and saving them; one’s non-action does not make the drowning
more likely – but nor does it make the harm done less likely. This is a deviation from the
Anglo-American legal tradition where someone cannot be held liable for watching some
else drown and not acting: ‘law casts no duty upon a man to go to the aid of another who is
in peril or distress, not caused by him’.54 Rather, it moves towards the European continen-
tal position that failure to rescue someone from imminent death is blameworthy: by
Article 222-6 of the French Code Pénal, liability is imposed on ‘anyone who wilfully
refrains from helping and assisting a person in danger, when he could have done so or
caused others to do so without risk to himself or third parties’.55 The argument therefore
is that by not making the road harder when one reasonably could, the road is in fact made
easier, meaning that one thus becomes involved and is therefore complicit. This includes
acts such as unnecessary aiding after the fact, remaining passively neutral and failing to
protest, where all such (in)actions would have no real bearing on the realisation of the
end result, but where action could, at least minimally, have forestalled it. In the case of
unnecessary aiding after the fact, for example, when the aid could be equally sourced else-
where and so lack of aid would have no real impact, the individual still makes themselves
personally morally culpable by being involved. They are still in the chain of events, even
though they come after, and have made the process easier overall by failing to make it
harder. Equally, staying neutral makes the process easier for the perpetrators because
there is no resistance to their actions, an ease which makes those who should have pro-
tested culpable. This means we can distinguish between non-involvement and inaction.
Non-involvement is where the actor, due to a lack of knowledge or the expectation of
knowledge, or lack of a bond that creates a direct duty of care, is not involved and so
their non-involvement is not related to the harm because they were not aware that
their action was required; whereas inaction is where the actor is actively making their
non-involvement clear by actively not-acting. Therefore, passive awareness can be a
form of assent or support for an act, which means that the actor’s non-action’s assent is
contributing to the harm done. Falling at the bottom of the spectrum, this means
staying neutral can be connected; that failure to act or protest is an instance where the
actor’s inaction means they have failed to prevent the harm and, even though their
action would not have contributed to the avoidance of that harm, in doing so they are
still connected to the event and so should be blamed.
In order for one to not be seen as facilitating the harm done one must act counter to the
intensions of the harmer. Each actor still has an obligation to ensure that their own actions
are, at least, not connected to the harm, and, moreover, have the minimum requirement to
raise awareness of the harm by protesting or actively disentangling oneself. There are two
aspects to this. The first is the prospect that public disentanglement might possibly dimin-
ish the likelihood of the harmful end being realised. This would be a contribution to the
avoidance of the harm. However, even if this is not possible or even if public denounce-
ment is not likely to have any effect, then the actor should still actively disentangle them-
selves to ensure that they are not included and so do not suffer from the moral taint.
Therefore, if the situation is such that actors are involved by being aware of the harm
or by there being some relationship, then they should actively move to separate themselves
from the event even if that separation will have no effect. Otherwise they will become
morally tainted by the connection, no matter how thin.
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Finally, a connected question is what intent there was behind the contribution.56 While
Kadish argues this intent can be vague57 and David Luban struggles with distinguishing
between the actually innocent, those who purposefully hide their heads in the sand like
an ostrich, and those who set up plausible deniability like a fox,58 it will be argued here
that although intent is important, it must be actively reflected in the activities of the indi-
vidual. I argue that claiming a lack of intent or maintaining a neutral stance is insufficient,
and if one intends that no harm should be caused one must demonstrate this through
actions that physically challenge the efforts of the primary actor. Therefore, given that
even non-causal involvement can be seen as a connection to the harm-doer, in order to
ensure that one’s (in)actions are a reflection of one’s desire to cause no harm then an
actor must go in the opposite direction: they must undermine the efforts of the harm-
giver, whether physically or symbolically. This effectively raises the bar significantly,
and means that as long as it does not endanger them there is a duty for people to act
lest they become complicit in the harm done by another.
Using these understandings of the duty of care, foreknowledge and proximity to the
harm, it is possible to create a spectrum of interweaving factors that distributes the
blame along it. For example, those whose actions have a high proximity to the harm
caused, where someone has a specific duty to ensure those harmed were protected and
knew how their actions would contribute, should face a greater degree of blame than
those who were a contributory but non-causal factor and were only vaguely aware or in
a general position of responsibility; but those at the latter level would still face a greater
level of blame than those who were on the bottom rung of the institutional ladder with
little knowledge, impact or opportunity to protest (see Table 3).
Aiding the transfer: fly-bys, stopping-off points and watching posts
Compared to those easy cases where an actor has directly involved himself in the rendi-
tions process – the apprehension, transfer or end point, for example59 – the cases discussed
here are where the duty of care, expectation of knowledge or relationship to the harm is
unclear. The first set of cases examined include states that allowed the use of their airspace
or airports to facilitate the rendition process – whether before, during or after the actual
torture – or those who were aware but failed to act. This includes, firstly, ‘stopover points’
used after or before the rendition has occurred (where the plane would set down, on its
way out or on its way home, to refuel), which were reported to include airports in the
UK, Ireland, Portugal and Greece.60 For example, The Guardian reports that flight
records from the US Federal Aviation Administration specify that the UK was acting as
a refuelling station for the CIA’s rendition programme. In 2013, The Guardian informed
Table 3. Activity types and the relationship to harm.
Level of blame Low Low/medium Medium/high High
Relationship to
harm caused
Non-causal non-
contributors
Non-causal
contributors
Non-causal
contributors
Causal contributors
Activity examples . Failure to protest
. Passive assent
. Unnecessary aid
after the fact
. Causal influencers
. Sanctioning
. Unnecessary
contributions
. Enabling acts
. Necessary but
not sufficient
. Direct causal
links
. Co-principles
. Necessary and
sufficient
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on a report by the Open Society Justice Initiative that named 54 foreign governments that
participated in the CIA programme. This included Finland, Ireland and Denmark allow-
ing the use of their facilities to transport suspects; while Sweden arranged for suspects to be
flown directly to Egypt; and also the CIA had carried out operations through the UK num-
bering ‘at least 210 times since 9/11’ involving ‘19 British airports and RAF [Royal Air
Force] bases, including Heathrow, Gatwick, Birmingham, Luton, Bournemouth and
Belfast’.61
Secondly, ‘staging points’ are places from which operations were launched, and include
Spain, Turkey, Germany and Cyprus. This includes cases involving Martin Mubanga in
April 2002, Abu al-Kassem Britel in May 2002, Mohammed Slahi and Binyam
Mohamed in July 2002, and Adduh Ali Shaqawi and Hassan bin Attash in January
2004.62 Thirdly, ‘one-off pick-up points’ are those places from which the target is captured,
though not necessarily with the host state’s consent or as part of a systematic occurrence.
For example, judge Chiara Nobili of Milan signed the arrest warrants for 13 CIA operat-
ives who are suspected of seizing an imam named Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, also
known as Abu Omar, as he walked to his mosque for noon prayers on 17 February
2003.63 Other examples include the picking up of detainees in Sweden, Gambia, Macedo-
nia, Italy and Bosnia and Herzegovina for rendition or unlawful transfer.64 In each of these
cases it has been reported that torture was used on those involved.
In order to determine the extent to which these additional legs of the rendition circuit
were culpable for the harm that was caused in the middle, it is important to understand
whether there is a duty of care placed on the host state creating a duty to act, especially
in those cases where the target was not actually on board. The answer is one of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction as a concept can simply be understood as the sphere over which one has
control, a position that establishes a particular relationship between those within the
bounded area and those who are bestowed with authority over it. Indeed, the Convention
Against Torture makes it explicit that it expects states to ensure that their territories are
free from any implication of torture:
Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over
the offences… (a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or
on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State.65
For those instances, therefore, when the individual was on board, it can be argued that
the state had a duty to act and protect him from any subsequent torture. This duty falls
well within the Convention Against Torture’s Article Three, which states that ‘No State
Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture’.66 The level of care expected in this instance is therefore significant: as host the
state has an explicit and general duty of care towards those individuals on the plane
that they will not be harmed or go on to be harmed; there is a relationship of trust that
individuals who fall within the state’s jurisdictional boundaries will be afforded the
state’s protections. Furthermore, this is specifically the duty of the intelligence community
as a specialised and directed profession whose role is to protect the state and its security
interests.
Furthermore, it can be argued that in those cases where the plane was on the way to or
returning from a rendition operation, the state had an obligation to detain those involved:
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‘Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jur-
isdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory
under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him’.67 States have an obligation to ensure
that those who are within their jurisdiction, no matter how fleetingly, are subjected to their
rules and norms. Moreover, it can be argued that states have an international jurisdiction
through their actions on the international stage. That is, when states operate on the inter-
national stage, regardless of whether this is viewed in terms of being part of an inter-
national society or as an archaic free-for-all, when their interactions impact on others
this creates a form of relationship. Indeed, in Donoghue v Stevenson in 1932, a key case
establishing the duty of care in questions of liability, Lord Atkin writing for the majority
argued that relationships can include any
persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have
them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omis-
sions which are called in question.68
This means that when one’s actions impact on another, a relationship is created and
from this a duty of care that is quite significant. Therefore, in all three instances of facility
use – ‘stopover points’, ‘staging points’ and ‘one-off pick-up points’ – the duty of care fea-
tures at the high end of the spectrum given the state’s duty towards those individuals on
board the plane as hosts, and even when the plane is empty a duty of care is created when
their decision to not intervene will negatively impact others.
Next, being able to foresee the harm caused in cases of extraordinary rendition breaks
down to a set of questions regarding, first, whether those who should have known knew;
second, if not, should they have asked; third, if they did indeed ask, should they have believed
the answer; and fourth, do their actions reflect their claims of intention. From looking at the
UK’s own government report, it was claimed that they did not know that their airspace or
airports were being used. The Director General of the Security Service told the Rendition
committee that ‘We have no knowledge of any detainees being subject to rendition
through British territory since 9/11; nor have we helped any “Extraordinary Renditions”
via UK airspace or territory’.69 Moreover, given the routine sharing of resources between
the two states (the US and the UK), the Director General continues that this would mean
there was no clear moment when permission was sought and therefore rejected by the
UK.70 If this is the case then an argument can be made that given the fleeting time on
British soil, there would be no real reason for the UK government to be aware of what
was going on and so could not necessarily be held liable for their role in the harm that
was caused. The Secretary of State for Transport told the Intelligence and Security Commit-
tee that because each of these flights was registered as a civilian aircraft there was no direct
need for a request on how the facilities were to be used: ‘The UK grants a block approval to
many countries and, in the case of the US, arrangements for a standing block approval [for
state aircraft] to land in the UK have been in place since at least 1949’.71
A simple lack of knowledge, however, is not sufficient. The intelligence community is
not a layperson, but a highly specialised branch of the government whose job it is to collect
information and act as a repository of expertise for all threats that face the state, regardless
of their form. It is both highly knowledgeable and informed. Moreover, not only can we
expect a greater level of awareness from the organisation as a whole, but its trained officials
should be held to a higher standard as a clearly distinguished set of professionals, acting on
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behalf of the state with specific and specialised knowledge and training. Indeed, states are
obliged to ‘ensure that education and information regarding the prohibition against
torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel’.72 Therefore, as
a profession they have a greater obligation to carry out due diligence regarding their
area of expertise. This means there is a duty on behalf of the intelligence community to
inquire about how other states are using their sovereign territory in order to make sure
that this use is aligned with the principles they are charged to protect.
The question, therefore, is whether it is reasonable to check each plane that flies
through one’s land. Indeed, the Director General of the Security Service highlighted
that ‘Unless you say you are going to search every aircraft to check the truth of what
you are told, it is a difficult issue… and frankly I doubt the police have the resources to
do this’.73 This is, on one level, reasonable, as information provided by someone else –
especially someone with a longstanding cordial relationship – is assumed to be legitimate,
and it is not expected that one must corroborate all sources of information presented.
However, this good faith must have a limit in order to prevent it becoming simple
blind faith.74 The Prime Minister told the Intelligence and Security Committee that ‘the
Government has not sought to establish whether aircraft that may have previously or sub-
sequently been involved in rendition operations have transited UK territory (including
Overseas Territories) or airspace’, which indicates that there was no effort to ascertain
the nature of the activities being carried out by the CIA. This raises concerns, especially
given what the British intelligence community itself refers to as unsettling language
coming from the USA post-9/11. They noted a growing awareness that there had been
‘a real shift in the US approach, and in the nature of the rendition programme’.75
Indeed, immediately after 9/11 there were systematic moves by the USA to make
torture a more viable option. First it was claimed that the Geneva Conventions did not
apply to al Qaeda suspects, and that neither they nor the Taliban would be eligible for
‘prisoner of war’ status;76 second, on 13 November 2001, orders were given that
allowed for the detention of all Al-Qaeda suspects and denied them access to any civilian
court, thus relegating them to military tribunals;77 and, third, in August 2002, a Justice
Department memorandum redefined a narrower account of ‘torture’ under US law than
the Geneva Conventions allowed, and limited it to abuses causing physical pain ‘equivalent
in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure,
impairment of bodily function, or even death’.78 Each of these actions demonstrates an
exerted effort to make extreme forms of interrogation more readily accessible.79 Although
these events arguably led the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS but also known as
MI6) to follow a more cautious approach,80 what is not clear is why no real assurances
were ascertained. These should have acted as clear signs to the UK that it was not business
as usual. Indeed, the Detainee Inquiry noted that as early as January 2002 the UK’s SIS
were aware that individuals were being rendered to third-party states that they were not
nationals of for interrogation.81 The directors of the intelligence organisations must not
simply ‘sit back and wait for management to bring the matter to the board’s attention’,
but should investigate how their partners plan to use their facilities.82 In reality this
reflects, at best, Luban’s ostrich burying its head, or at worst his fox seeking deniability.
Ambiguity regarding what is known, rather than acting as a protection, indicts them
further as their intent is not reflected in their actions. If their intent was to avoid contri-
buting to the harm of another then they have a duty to ensure that their actions work
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against the CIA’s efforts, rather than maintaining the status quo or by taking a position of
neutrality. It can be argued, therefore, that in combination this should have prompted
increased scrutiny regarding the purpose for the use of the facilities in all three types of
cooperation, and that therefore this features at the higher end of the spectrum. This
means that there is a clear need to be informed and failure to be so does not remove
the blame.
Next, in order to ascribe moral blame, it is necessary that there is some relationship to
the harm caused. For ‘one-off pick-up points’ where a state allows or actively authorises
the detainment of individuals from within their space – including warrant signing by
judge Chiara Nobili for the arrest of Abu Omar – the involvement features at one the
highest points on the spectrum of blame. These contributions are necessary and irreplace-
able causal contributions, and are akin to Lombard’s enabling acts. For cases involving
stopovers that come before and staging points from which the rendition is launched it
can be argued that the state’s involvement is a necessary – though not irreplaceable –
role in the chain of events. The state’s involvement in these cases would feature relatively
high on the spectrum of blame, because rendition is making the process much easier than
if it refused to cooperate and arguably makes a causal contribution to the whole pro-
gramme. Whereas for those stopovers that come afterwards, the involvement is less
clear because the involvement is unrequired and its impact is uncertain. So, initially, it
could be argued that the act of allowing one’s airspace or territory to be used after the
extraordinary rendition process falls at the lower end of the complicity spectrum. From
the taxonomy outlined, the role of the UK government was not a dependent one. The
use of the airspace was not, in these cases, a necessary factor for the torture to take
place. They did not set the conditions required for the operation to go ahead, nor was
the end counterfactually dependent on UK involvement, and so they are not enablers.
Indeed, it could be argued that the overall extraordinary rendition programme would
have continued regardless of the (in)actions taken by the UK government at this stage.
The UK’s failure to act comes at the end. The damage is done. However, this does not
mean that their involvement was nil. At a minimum, it could be considered aiding after
the fact.83 As noted in the previous section, this means that the UK government should
act to separate itself from the chain of events even if it feels this would not alter the
outcome. Moreover, it can be argued that it even has a duty to publicly condemn or
protest the programme; again, even though this might have no real impact it should be
done in order to separate the UK government from the moral taint and the subsequent
blame.
However, while this could mean that the involvement features at the lower end of the
spectrum, it can also be argued that for those states that allowed the use of their facilities
even after the event their involvement goes further than this, as allowing such use rep-
resents a sanctioning of the act. As outlined, sanctioning harm through one’s own (in)ac-
tion does play an important role featuring in the middle of the spectrum, where, even
though one is not necessarily the instigator, such actions act as non-necessary contri-
butions that promote the act by making it both easier and more likely, adding legitimacy
to the act. It can be interpreted that these states, by not acting either physically or symbo-
lically at any stage of the process, passively sanctioned the activities taken by the US forces.
For example, as a close ally it can be argued that the opinion of the UK government
regarding the American Administration is not an unimportant one; that their long-
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term intelligence cooperation means that the UK has influence with those in power.
Equally, in the case of Germany as a staging-post and Italy for allowing individuals to
be kidnapped from its territory, their role at the beginning and middle of the process
means that they are in a place where their (in)activity makes the rendition more likely
and so actively promotes the harm caused. There was a clear obligation to either
protect those who fall within one’s jurisdiction or to take custody of those who had
carried out the operation or were planning to do so. Importantly, given the role that
these states played – alongside a duty to be informed on how their actions might cause
harm to others – they should have sought to undermine the CIA, and failing to do so
makes them complicit in the harm done, and therefore blameworthy and punishable.
This places them in the middle of the spectrum of blame, below the main actors but occu-
pying a clear position that demonstrates that their failure to act. That is, they had a duty to
detain those who were refuelling, to demand that those who were in their airspace landed
and to detain those inside, and to publicly denounce the USA for its extraordinary rendi-
tion programme. What this means is that in actual fact all three aiding methods – stop-
over, staging and pick-ups – even when the individual was not on board – are located
at least at a mid-point on the spectrum of blame.
Importantly, the actions of the UK are more involved again. In the case of Binyam
Mohamed, the Security Service (MI5) continued to receive reports from CIA interroga-
tions and even declared itself ‘grateful for the opportunity to provide material to be
used in the current debriefing’ after it began channelling questions through the CIA.84
This level of involvement places the UK’s Security Service as an enabler in the harm suf-
fered and so it is located at the top levels of the spectrum of blame. Therefore, significant
blame should have been levied at those intelligence officers who authorised such aid or
failed to prevent the use of state facilities. Importantly, however, this also means that
those executive members in charge of these intelligence agencies – in the UK namely
the Secretary of State for the Home Department for Security Service and the Foreign Sec-
retary for MI6, and, finally, the Prime Minister – face ultimate blame for the UK’s invol-
vement and its failure to protest or forestall the harm.
Finally, for those states that had no role in the actual rendition process it can be argued
that they still had a duty to act. For those states which did not know, and it would be
unreasonable to expect them to have known, they can claim they cannot be held respon-
sible for failing to act. However, those who are aware or should have been aware must
ensure that they not contributing and are actively undermining the USA’s programme
most broadly. Allowing the use of one’s airspace or failing to lodge a protest only
serves to make the process easier, and by doing so one becomes complicit in the harm
done. Those individuals who are responsible for authorising their state’s or organisation’s
(non)involvement in the extraordinary rendition programmes have a direct duty of care as
a result of their organisational position, and by not acting against the programme are
directly responsible for the harm caused and should be punished according to the level
of their involvement. Actions that aid the state causing the harm create complicity, and
if states wish to show that their intent is not to aid then they must demonstrate how
they are undermining the efforts of the extraordinary rendition programme. This could
be related to extraordinary rendition specifically by preventing any US aircraft travelling
through their space, engaging in lengthy searches or issuing high financial costs to fly
through their space, or it could try and undermine the CIA’s efforts most broadly by
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making the cost of doing business for the US as a whole high, by issuing sanctions –
whether financial, political or social. The failure to protest or refuse to provide even
this minimal assistance means they are complicit, though minimally in comparison to
other forms of involvement, and so rest at the lower end of the spectrum. What this
means is states that even only allow the use of their airspace are tacitly easing the
process, encouraging it, and so also face a degree of blame. Public condemnation, even
after the fact, of the actions would make it clear that these states are not a part of the
harm caused and so could play an important role in forestalling the programme overall.
Indeed, retributions, embargos on travel or at least increased searches would indicate
an effort to condemn the extraordinary rendition programme in general. Not acting
can be seen as tacit consent. On balance, therefore, what this means is that there is a
clear duty not to be involved in the harm caused, even when one’s non-involvement
would not change the outcome (see Table 4).
Intelligence cooperation: sharing resources, sharing intelligence
The second set of cases examined includes those instances where an intelligence agency
shared information that then initiated or led to the rendition of an individual. Intelligence
sharing between allies such as the UK and the USA is a regular practice that serves to
create a greater wealth of knowledge and acts to protect both states. In the Rendition
report by the British Intelligence and Security Committee, all three Heads of British intel-
ligence argued that information sharing was a vital aspect of protecting state interests,
especially in terms of fighting international terrorism: ‘It is neither practical, desirable,
Table 4. Aiding the transfer and the level of blame.
Extradition stage Complicity Duty of care Knowledge
Stopover point:
. With target on
board
Middle high:
. Necessary step
. Causally
contributing
High:
. Duty of care to
those within one’s
jurisdiction
. Duty of care
towards those
whose own
(in)actions will
impact
Intelligence – high:
. Duty to be aware how security
facilities are being used
. Agency leaders should investigate
international cooperation after
reports of torture
Political – high:
. Expectation to be informed on how
state infrastructure and
international cooperation is being
used; reports of torture by others
increases the duty to investigate
Stopover point:
. Before/after; no
target on board
Middle:
. Sanctioning act
. Non-causally
contributing
Staging point:
. Launching point
Middle high:
. Necessary step
. Causally
contributing
One-off pick-up point
. Warrant for arrest
Very high:
. Necessary, enabling
act; causally
contributory
Use of airspace/
awareness with no
response
Low:
. Failure to protest
. Limit passive
cooperation
. No hindering
activity
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nor is it in the national interest, for UK Agencies to carry out [counter-terrorism] work
independently of the US effort’.85 However, despite this being a common feature of
inter-state relations, the question is whether one can be blamed for the harm done by
others as a result of the knowledge one has shared. This is what Dick Marty referred to
in his report as ‘passing on information or intelligence to the United States where it
was foreseeable that such material would be relied upon directly to carry out a “rendition”
operation or to hold a person in secret detention’.86
One example is that of Mohammed Zammar, a German of Syrian origin who was
arrested when he left Morocco to return home for Germany. The case has received exten-
sive press coverage, and there have been allegations that Mr Zammar was tortured by
Syrian services.87 Dick Marty’s report outlines how ‘Mr Zammar’s arrest in Morocco
was objectively facilitated by exchanges of information between the German services
and their Dutch, Moroccan and also American counterparts’,88 and ‘that he was ques-
tioned in Syria by German officials’.89 Another example is that of Binyam Mohamed al
Habashi, an Ethiopian citizen who has held status in the United Kingdom, who was
detained and transported to Guantanamo Bay where he claims he was subjected to
torture.90 Arrested by Pakistani officials at Karachi Airport on 10 April 2002, Binyam
reports that the initial interrogation involved British and American agents.91 It has
been reported that ‘During his illegal interrogations, he has been confronted with alle-
gations that could only have arisen from intelligence provided by the United
Kingdom’92 and it became clear that British intelligence was cooperating with the interrog-
ation as ‘Much of the personal information – including details of his education, his friend-
ships in London and even his kickboxing trainer – could only have originated from
collusion in this interrogation process by UK intelligence services’.93 For each of these
cases the question is whether intelligence cooperation is in itself enough to warrant
blame, raising questions regarding the extent it is reasonable to foresee such harms as
well as how far from the eventual torture one is in the chain of events.
In terms of the duty of care, from the cases mentioned there are two distinct instances
involved. First are cases where the individual is a national of the state sharing the infor-
mation, meaning there is arguably a special relationship between the state and its own citi-
zens. However, slightly more problematic are those cases where the individual is not a
national nor is there necessarily any geographical jurisdictional relationship as seen in
the first set of cases. Again, following the precedence outlined in Donoghue v Stevenson
it can still be argued that there is a duty of care. This means that the intelligence
agency creates a relationship with those it shares intelligence on when that cooperation
causes an impact on the target’s life.
Understanding the ability to foresee the impact of sharing information, however, is less
clear. Its routine nature, much like the flights, means that it would be unreasonable to
inquire into every case of intelligence sharing. Moreover, intelligence rarely works like
this. Intelligence is a piecemeal activity of gathering bits of information from many differ-
ent sources, with intelligence often being as ‘sparse as a telephone number or an address to
check’.94 This therefore reduces the ability to track down the future implications of how
any singular bit of information might be used. Furthermore, the British, German and
Dutch governments all claim that they did not know, nor could have expected, that the
Americans would end up subjecting these individuals to torture: ‘These exchanges of
information about the travel plans of a person suspected of terrorist activities (the
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German government’s report contains detailed information which seem to justify such
suspicion) are part of normal international co-operation in the fight against terrorism’.95
It cannot, for example, be deduced from the fact that the German services informed their
colleagues of the dates on whichMr Zammar had flight reservations that it was their inten-
tion that he would be arrested and held in violation of normal procedures. Also, in the case
of Bisher and Jamil, the UK’s position is that ‘It is possible that the Gambian police or
border authorities at Banjul airport decided to search the men based on a “hunch” – some-
thing that happens routinely at customs and immigration points around the world’.96 The
claim is the intelligence community simply did not know, nor could they have reasonably
been expected to know, that this was how their intelligence would be used: ‘We are talking
about the Americans, our closest ally’.97
However, there are reports that indicate otherwise: that the British intelligence commu-
nity was aware of the extraordinary rendition programme much earlier than they have
since indicated. A report released in The Guardian claims that ‘Within days of the 9/11
attacks on the US, the CIA told British intelligence officers of its plans to abduct al-
Qaida suspects and fly them to secret prisons where they would be systematically
abused’.98 It is reported that Cofer Black, co-ordinator for Counter-Terrorism under Pre-
sident George W. Bush, met with his MI6 counterpart, Mark Allen – to outline their ren-
dition plans.99 If this is true then it would increase the knowledge of the British intelligence
community and therefore increase the degree to which they are blameworthy for their part
in the rendition process. However, even ignoring this claim it has already been noted that
the strong rhetoric and actions taken by the Bush Administration following the 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks should have left the intelligence community doubting American intentions.
This means that given the change in laws relating to the treatment of those suspected of
terrorism, and the tone of the US, any cooperating state should have sought better assur-
ances. This establishes an obligation on the intelligence community to check, with explicit
assurances, on how the intelligence is being received and therefore will be used. If there are
suspicions that the intelligence could be used to an unethical end then the relationship is
abused and future sharing must come under greater scrutiny as well as raise the prospect
of ending the relationship completely. This means there is a strong expectation that intel-
ligence professionals were informed on how their information was being used, making
them specifically blameworthy.
Finally, in terms of proximity to the harm caused in these cases, rather than being an
accessory after the torture, the question is to what extent providing information before
the rendition places the intelligence agency as a key figure towards that particular end.
Applying the taxonomy outlined, it can be seen that sharing intelligence falls in the
top half of the spectrum. Indeed, it can be argued that providing intelligence is a necess-
ary factor, an enabling act on which the rendition is dependent. Without the information
the rendition would never have happened. The information outlined who was a supposed
threat, where they would be and why they were suspected of being a threat. Given that
the rendition is dependent on – though not caused by – the information being offered, it
can be argued that the providing intelligence agency is in close proximity to the harm
caused. So, while the UK’s involvement was not a cause this involvement placed it as
a key actor in events, meaning that its failure to seek greater information about how
the information was to be used places it as a key actor in being blamed for the harm
that then followed.
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This therefore sets a rigorous bar for intelligence sharing, though still with different
degrees of involvement. In those cases where British intelligence was in the room there
is essentially no claim of plausible deniability that can be made. The evidence before
them meant they should have investigated further as to how the individual was being
treated, why they were in that condition and who else was involved. If it is physically
dangerous for the intelligence officer present to speak out, once home and free of
danger they have a duty to reveal what it is they saw. If they do not physically and publicly
reveal what they saw, the harm done can be directly tied to them and they can be person-
ally blamed and punished for the harm caused. In those cases where questions were sup-
plied but the officers were not present, there is still a direct connection and a duty of care
as the questions create a bond to the victim. Indeed, providing questions comes with the
expectation that some form of interrogation will occur (though not necessarily torturous
interrogation) and so should come with extra, physical reassurances that the interrogation
was performed humanely. In instances where general information about someone is pro-
vided, while claims could be made that it is unreasonable to know exactly how others will
use that information, it is necessary to actively ensure correct conduct. However, while
Gaskarth claims that the inclusion of caveats reflects a desire to limit the UK’s involvement
in torture, it could also indicate an attempt to be Luban’s fox with plausible deniability.
Therefore, given the clear possibility of misconduct, actions should be taken that reflect
the intent not to aid in causing others harm and to demand that there are physical reas-
surances on how the information is being used. Without such proof the caveats themselves
are worthless. What this means is that the bar set for information sharing is high. Once the
harmful practices became known, or even were hinted at being a possibility, the UK should
have not have maintained the status quo but should have actively undermined the US
extraordinary rendition programme by withholding intelligence support across the
board. Any support given, even in other areas, makes the whole CIA process easier,
and by withholding intelligence support in other areas the UK would not only have
shown an intent to not support a state carrying out torture but would also have made
the costs of doing so higher.
Therefore, it can be argued that these states should receive a significant degree of blame.
In the case of Abdul-Hakim Belhaj who sued the UK government for colluding in his ren-
dition in Tripoli in 2011, it can be argued that British intelligence faces one of the highest
levels of blame given the long history of Libyan human rights abuses and the direct link
highlighted between the intelligence sharing and the detention of Belhaj. In comparison,
the case of Bisher Al-Rawi and Jamil El-Banna features slightly lower given that the intel-
ligence agency did seek to place important caveats on how their information should be
used, prohibiting ‘overt, covert or executive action’.100 However, these caveats do not
release them from all blame as it has been demonstrated that there should have been a
greater understanding of how one’s intelligence might be received given the political
climate, the expressed concerns of abuse, and the possibility of harmful repercussions.
This case demonstrates a need to be sure about the validity of any intelligence or
indeed judgements shared, especially with states that have a record of lower human
rights standards. Finally, in the case of BinyamMohamed al Habashi, if British intelligence
were present at any interrogation stage as claimed then this would place them very near
the top of the spectrum given their close proximity to the harm being caused and their
increased awareness. However, if British involvement provided information on
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Binyam’s lifestyle then this would feature at the middle end of the spectrum as it did not
instigate the rendition, or promote it, but the sharing of the information did feature in the
torture and could not have be sourced elsewhere. The impact of these findings is that these
individuals subjected to torture as a result of the rendition process have recourse to retri-
butions from each of these states, meaning that each state must now act to redress the
balance of its own contribution (see Table 5).
Conclusion
It can be argued, therefore, that there should be a wider understanding of what it means to
be involved in human rights abuses at the international level; that states, institutions and
individuals can all be held equally liable for the harm done; and that all three levels should
both be punished for their involvement and give appropriate compensation. What this
means is that, first, there is a clear need that those harmed are provided with an avenue
to demand recompense not just from one state but from all those involved. There
should be a structure that is able to take multiple actors to task and demand appropriate
recompense from everyone, rather than expecting an individual to suffer through different
legal systems where multiple actors are dismissed on claims of limited involvement or liab-
ility. Furthermore, while it is difficult to hold states to account for human rights abuses,
highlighting those who are specifically responsible because of the position they held
means that there is an individual or set of individuals who should be made to stand
accountable. Second, there should be a more clearly established chain of command.
Indeed, the Detainee Inquiry noted that ‘it is not clear how complete a picture of the
Agencies’ growing awareness of the new scope of US rendition practice was communi-
cated to Ministers’ throughout the renditions.101 Ministers should have been aware of
the programme, raising concerns that they were either being purposefully left out or
that they were choosing to be uniformed to avoid liability. Either way, they are responsible
for ensuring the ethical conduct of the intelligence community, and failure to be informed
therefore makes them personally liable for the harm done; therefore, they should face pun-
ishment as such. Finally, claims that it ‘could not in any way amount to complicity in any
Table 5. Intelligence sharing and the level of blame.
Intelligence sharing Complicity Duty of care Knowledge
. Potential threat level
. Recent activities and
acquaintances
High
. Necessary enabling act;
. Causally contributory
. Forms basis of decision
to act
High:
. Duty of care
towards those
whose own actions
will impact
Intelligence professionals:
. Explicitly aware of how
their information is being
used
. Any concerns or
possibility of misuse
information should not
be shared
Political:
. Aware of how their
intelligence leaders are
acting
. Duty to inquire
. Personal information
. Information only
available through
intelligence operations
Medium
. Sharing necessary
. Used against the target
. General, public
information
Medium/low
. Non-causal role
. Not necessarily needing
to have come from
intelligence partnership
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unlawful activity… unless [they] had full knowledge’ and that involvement should include
a physical involvement with ‘the detainee on board’ sets the bar too high.102 States have an
active duty to seek out full information, which must then be interrogated and that states
must actively distance themselves from the wrongdoing of others lest their passive inaction
be seen as involvement.
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